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THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT'S PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE BAR: DEFINING THE LINE
BETWEEN PARASITIC AND BENEFICIAL
J. Morgan Phelps'
Fraudulent claims against the federal government have become a
growing problem in the United States,' accounting for enormous losses to
the U.S. treasury.2 It is estimated that every year these losses reach into
the billions of dollars In addition to the significant monetary losses,
fraud also takes a toll on the public's trust. Rampant fraud erodes pub-
lic confidence and raises questions about the government's ability to
manage its programs.
Originally passed during the Civil War in 1863, and amended most re-
cently in 1986, the False Claims Act (FCA or the Act) is an important
tool in the government's attempt to curb fraud.6 Although its original
goal was to catch dishonest contractors cheating the Union Army,7 the
'J.D. candiate, May 2000, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1986, S. REP. No. 99-345, at 2 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267 [hereinafter FCA AMENDMENTS; page num-
bers will refer to the corresponding page in the Senate Report]. Although the government
does not have precise figures, judging by discoveries of fraud amongst the largest govern-
ment contractors, the legislative history of the False Claims Act indicates that "the prob-
lem is severe." Id. at 1-2. In 1985, Department of Defense Inspector General Joseph
Sherick testified before Congress that "45 of the 100 largest defense contractors, including
9 of the top 10, were under investigation for multiple fraud offenses." Id at 2 (footnote
omitted).
2. See id. at 3 (noting that the General Accounting Office reports indicate losses into
the billions).
3. See Tammy Hinshaw, Annotation, Construction and Application of "Public Dis-
closure" and "Original Source" Jurisdictional Bars Under 31 USCS § 3730(e) (4) (Civil Ac-
tions for False Claims), 117 A.L.R. FED. 263, 263 (1994). According to a General Ac-
counting Office report, up to ten percent of the entire federal budget is lost due to fraud.
See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 3.
4. See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that fraud damages the gov-
ernment monetarily as well as by an erosion of public confidence).
5. See id. Fraud against the government may also result in a loss of life or, in some
instances, a threat to national security, such as where the contractor fraudulently certifies
defective equipment as meeting quality control standards. See id.
6. See John T. Boese, The Science and Art of Defending a Civil False Claims Act
Case Brought by a Qui Tam Relator, AM. BAR ASS'N CENTER FOR CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUC. NAT'L INST. 1 (1997).
7. See id. One documented abuse involved Colt selling revolvers worth $14.50 each
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FCA is now used to weed out fraudulent claims in all federally funded
programs,' especially those involving health care. 9
Because exposing fraud is usually very difficult without the help of
persons close to the transaction,0 Congress included qui tam1 provisions
in the Act . These provisions provide incentives for private citizens to
"blow the whistle" when they become privy to unscrupulous conduct.
13
Getting people to "turn" on their employers, co-workers, and partners,
however, is no easy task." To overcome this natural reluctance, Con-
gress has had to incorporate significant monetary rewards for successful
qui tam plaintiffs." Although these rewards have the potential to make a
significant dent in the government's own recovery, the government will
on the open market to the government for $25.00 each. See United States ex rel. Newsham
v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 722 F. Supp. 607, 609 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
8. See Boese, supra note 6, at 1 (noting that the FCA has been used in a wide variety
of white collar fraud cases, including areas such as healthcare, the environment, banking,
food stamps, and flood relief).
9. See id. Currently, 70% to 80% of FCA claims are filed against government con-
tractors and health care providers. See id. Since 1986, health care fraud cases brought by
qui tam plaintiffs have yielded $1.45 billion in recoveries. See Stuart M. Gerson, Will New
Federal Guidelines Arrest Overzealous Use of False Claims Act?, LEGAL
BACKGROUNDER (Washington Legal Foundation, Washington D.C.), October 2, 1998, at
2; see also Robert Salcido, Mixing Oil and Water: The Government's Mistaken Use of the
Medicare Anti-Kickback Statute in False Claims Act Prosecutions, 6 ANNALs HEALTH L.
105, 105 (1997) (noting that the False Claims Act is the government's primary tool for liti-
gating fraud in the health care industry).
10. See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 4. Justice Department attorneys have
testified that the government has a difficult time gathering sufficient information to prose-
cute a successful civil fraud case. See id. at 5-6. The government's civil attorneys cannot
compel the production of documents before filing a case, and information that is gathered
by the government is often unavailable because it appears in a prior grand jury investiga-
tion (which is protected under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.) See
id.
11. A qui tam provision allows an informer to bring an action against a third party on
behalf of the government. See BLACKS LAW DICrIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990).
12. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (1994).
13. See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that one of the goals of the
legislation is to encourage individuals with knowledge of fraud to step forward).
14. See id. at 4 (finding "a great unwillingness to expose illegalities"). A survey of
approximately 5000 federal government employees reveals that 69% of them believe they
have had direct knowledge of illegalities and failed to report them. See id. A defense con-
tractor testified that although contractor employees would like to report fraud, there is no
incentive to do so in the defense industry. See id. at 5. "[M]ost individuals just simply
cannot and will not put their head on the chopping block." Id.
15. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (1994). A successful qui tam plaintiff may be awarded up
to 30% of the government's total recovery, which could result in a significant award con-
sidering the government is entitled to up to $10,000 per false claim as well as treble dam-
ages. See id. §§ 3729(a), 3730(d).
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gain in the long run.6 Without the help of whistleblowers, the govern-
ment would not discover many fraudulent transactions in the first place
and, thus, would never be able get any recovery at all. 7
Qui tam provisions may provide a useful way for the government to
draw assistance from the public, however, in the last six decades, many
suits have been brought for less than noble reasons." In the 1930s and
1940s, for example, plaintiffs brought suits based on information gleaned
from preexisting indictments and congressional investigations, effectively
snatching away part of the government's recovery.19
In an attempt to thwart these opportunists, Congress incorporated a
significant jurisdictional bar to filter out unwanted suits.20 The bar pro-
hibits courts from taking subject matter jurisdiction over suits where the
plaintiff's complaint is based upon information already in the public do-
main and the plaintiff is not an original source.2' In practice, courts have
subjected this jurisdictional bar, known as the public disclosure bar, to
22conflicting interpretations.
This Comment examines how the federal circuits have interpreted the
public disclosure bar, focusing on the conflicts and their significance to
qui tam litigation. First, this Comment explores the history of the public
disclosure bar along with court interpretations that have energized Con-
gressional reaction. Next, this Comment analyzes the circuits' differing
interpretations of the public disclosure bar and the reasons for the divi-
sions. Finally, this Comment concludes that courts should draw the ju-
risdictional line to maximize the appropriate use of the FCA.
16. See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 7-8 (finding that the government simply
lacks the necessary resources to weed out fraud on its own). With the help of private citi-
zens, however, allegations left unaddressed by the government can be explored in greater
depth. See id.
17. See id. at 4 (discussing the difficulty of detecting fraud without the assistance of
whistleblowers).
18. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943) (qui tam plain-
tiff copied a federal indictment and filed suit before the government).
19. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club, 105 F.3d
675,679-80 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
20. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)-(e).
21. See id. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B).
22. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 681 (noting that the circuits have taken opposing views on
how the public disclosure bar should be interpreted).
1999]
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE Qui TAM PROVISIONS IN THE FALSE
CLAIMS ACT
A. The Enactment of the False Claims Act
Qui tam is short for "'qui tam pro domino rege quam pro si ipso in hac
parte sequitur,"' which translates into "'who sues on behalf of the King as
well as for himself."'23  The concept originated in medieval England
where it was used as a way of enhancing the state's inadequate law en-
forcement capabilities.24 In the United States," the federal government
incorporated qui tam provisions into the FCA as a tool to help ferret out
the rampant defrauding of the Union Army during the Civil War."
Reasoning that the best way to catch a rogue was with a rogue, Con-
gress sought to encourage the co-conspirators of frauds to come forward
and betray illegal activities and offending parties.2 As the statute was
23. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990).
24. See United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 647
n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The use of private citizens to prosecute criminal and civil cases for
the state can be traced back to at least the sixth century B.C. See CHRISTOPHER CAREY,
TRIALS FROM CLASSICAL ATHENS 3 (1997). In the ancient city-state of Athens, Solon
first introduced the "right of prosecution by any volunteer" into the Greek system of jus-
tice as an attempt to take the administration of the law out of the exclusive hands of the
wealthy. Id. The modern qui tam provisions, however, derive from English common law
which relied on victims to prosecute their own criminal actions. See Harold J. Krent, Ex-
ecutive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L.
REV. 275, 290-91 (1989). To help cover the victim's legal fees, the British Parliament al-
lowed the victim to recover his expenses from the defendant after a successful trial. See id.
at 291. The modern qui tam laws are a direct outgrowth of this common law approach.
See id.
25. See Krent, supra note 24, at 292-93 (discussing the federal government's use of
qui tam provisions during the country's inception). Qui tam provisions were not new to
the United States. See id. at 291. Prior to the ratification of the Constitution in 1789, law
enforcement was primarily in the hands of American citizens who initiated prosecutions
directly or sued under qui tam provisions. See id. "[T]he First Congress authorized qui
tam suits in at least 10 of the first 14 statutes imposing penalties." United States ex rel.
Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 722 F. Supp. 607,609 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
26. See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 8. Fraudulent activities were so out of
control, one contemporaneous source states: "'[F]or sugar [the government] often got
sand; for coffee, rye; for leather, something no better than brown paper; for sound horses
and mules, spavined beasts and dying donkeys; and for serviceable muskets and pistols,
the experimental failures of sanguine inventors, or the refuse of shops and foreign armor-
ies."' Hinshaw, supra note 3, at 274 (quoting 1 F. SHANNON, THE ORGANIZATION AND
ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNION ARMY, 1861-1865 58 (1965)). The original FCA was
signed into law by President Abraham Lincoln in 1863. See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra
note 1, at 8.
27. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 679. Congress designed the qui tam provisions, at least in
part, to bypass dishonest public officials and law enforcement officers who may have been
intimately involved in the fraudulent conduct. See Robert Salcido, Screening Out Unwor-
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originally conceived, anyone could bring a suit against anyone who
knowingly submitted a false claim. Thus, an action to redress a fraudu-
lent claim against the federal government could be brought by an indi-
vidual as easily as it could be brought by the government. 9 As an incen-
tive to bring these suits, the government rewarded whistleblowers, called
"relators," with one-half of the government's recovery against offending
parties3° as well as with costs.31 Moreover, once an individual brought a
qui tam action, the government could not interfere with its prosecution.2
Despite these generous provisions, litigants rarely used the qui tam
provisions of the FCA during the next seventy years.33 It was not until
the federal government's drastic spending increases in the 1930s and
1940s that qui tam litigation began to boom.34 The New Deal and World
War II "opened up numerous opportunities for unscrupulous govern-
ment contractors to defraud the government.,
35
Along with "unscrupulous" contractors came "unscrupulous" rela-
tors.3 By allowing anyone to bring a suit, the FCA encouraged "para-
sitic" lawsuits.37 Seeking the rewards of successful qui tam litigation, pri-
vate parties brought suits without having any independent knowledge of
38the fraud. Parasitic suits were not only reducing the federal govern-
thy Whistleblower Actions: An Historical Analysis of the Public Disclosure Jurisdictional
Bar to Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act, 24 PUB. CONT. L.J. 237, 241 (1995).
28. See United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1153 (3d Cir. 1991). According to the 1863 statute, a suit "'may be
brought and carried on by any person, as well for himself as for the United States."' FCA
AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 10 (quoting the original False Claims Act). At the time,
however, the qui tam plaintiff bore the entire cost of the suit. See id.
29. See id. (noting that suits may be brought by both private individuals and the gov-
ernment with equal ease).
30. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 679. For civil penalties, the government was entitled to
double the amount that it suffered in damages due to the false claim, plus $2000 per claim.
See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 8.
31. See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 10.
32. See id. In United States v. Griswold, 30 Fed. Rep. 762, 763 (C.C.D. Or. 1887), the
court found that a relator's interest in his suit was a property right that could not be di-
vested.
33. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 679.
34. See id.; see also United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14
F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that qui tam litigation surged with the boom of gov-
ernment contracts during the New Deal and World War II).
35. Findley, 105 F.3d at 679.
36. See id. at 679-80 (discussing the surge of opportunistic relators who brought their
suits based on copies of preexisting indictments).
37. See id.
38. See United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1153 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Hinshaw, supra note 3, at 275 (examining
the flaw in the FCA that allowed relators to bring suits using information already uncov-
1999]
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ment's recovery, but they also forced it to make rapid choices on whether
or not to prosecute civil actions lest a qui tam plaintiff steal the case.39
Thus, litigation under the FCA became "a race to the courthouse be-. ,,40
tween the Government's civil lawyers and private parties, and im-
paired the ability of the Attorney General to control criminal and civil
41fraud actions.
B. The 1943 Amendments
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess42 finally prompted Congressional
action. This case involved a group of defendants criminally indicted for
collusive bidding on government contracts. 43  After the defendants
pleaded no contest and were fined $54,000,44 a qui tam plaintiff brought a
civil case against them using the same information found in the defen-
dant's indictment." The Supreme Court permitted the suit, stating that
the statute did not require a plaintiff to bring any new information to the
table,46 nor did it contemplate protecting the Attorney General's ability
to control fraud litigation.47
Determined to "put a stop to this unseemly and undignified scram-
ble,"" both Houses of Congress proposed bills that would modify the
ered in government investigations).
39. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 680.
40. FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 10-11 (observing that a civil action based on
a criminal indictment, as in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943), does
not bring any new information to light).
41. See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 10-11.
42. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
43. See id. at 539.
44. See id. at 545.
45. See id. at 539-40.
46. See id. at 545-46 (noting that neither the language of the FCA nor its history indi-
cates that the plaintiff should be barred from bringing suit). The Court considered and
rejected an amicus curiae brief filed by the Government asking the Court to disallow the
complaint because the relator's information was not acquired through an independent in-
vestigation. See id. The Court noted that, under the current statute, even a district attor-
ney who learned of a fraud in the exercise of his official duties might be allowed to bring a
qui tam suit based on his official investigation. See id. at 546.
47. See id. at 546-47 (noting that the Government's argument-that the Attorney
General's ability to control litigation would be impaired by allowing the plaintiff to bring
the case-was misguided). It was focused at "what the government thinks Congress
should have done rather than at what it did." Id.; see also FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note
1, at 11 (noting that the FCA did not grant the Attorney General exclusive control over
the federal fraud litigation).
48. Salcido, supra note 27, at 242 (quoting Letter from Attorney General Francis
Biddle to Senator Van Nuys, March 22, 1943).
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FCA.49 The House of Representatives' proposed bill eliminated the qui
tam provisions entirely. ° The Senate bill, on the other hand, proposed to
keep the qui tam provisions, but modified them to prevent parasitic,
Hess-like suits by inserting a jurisdictional bar for suits based on informa-
tion the government already possessed. Some congressmen, preferring
the loose standards of the current statute, objected to any change in the
Act.52 Senator Langer, for example, argued:
"[T]he present statute now on the books is a most desirable
one. What harm can there be if 10,000 lawyers in America are
assisting the Attorney General of the United States in digging
up war frauds? In any case, the Attorney General can protect
himself by filing a (civil) lawsuit at the time when he files the
indictment." 3
Eventually, the Senate version of the bill prevailed.54
In addition to the jurisdictional bar limiting standing, the Senate bill
made a number of refinements and other changes. For example, the
original version of the bill had also incorporated a special provision ex-
empting "original sources" of government information from the bar.5
This provision was dropped from the bill without explanation in a con-
ference committee compromise.56 Other changes included a reduction in
the amount a relator could claim in his suit.5 7 The award for a successful
qui tam suit dropped from a maximum of fifty percent of the total recov-
ery to twenty-five percent.58
49. See United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 650
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (analyzing the proposed House and Senate bills).
50. See id. Upset with "parasitic" suits, Representative Walter was prompted to
state: "It has become a racket and it seems to me that the quicker we eliminate the possi-
bility of harassing people by those who have not contributed one iota to the disclosures,
the better off the Nation will be." 89 CONG. REC. 2800 (1943).
51. See Springfield, 14 F.3d at 650.
52. See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 11 (noting Senator Langer of North
Dakota's contention that the government's limited resources and the delays accompanying
fraud cases argue for keeping the statute as it is).
53. Id. (quoting from 89 CONG. REC. 7607 (1943)).
54. See id. at 12.
55. See id.
56. See Springfield, 14 F.3d at 650. The legislative history of the 1986 amendments
suggests that Congress may not have fully understood what the ramifications would be
when it dropped the original source clause out of the Act. See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra
note 1, at 12.
57. See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 10, 12 (discussing amount of award to
which relator is entitled).
58. See id. If the government took over the suit, the relator could not collect more
than 10% of the proceeds. See 31 U.S.C. § 232(E)(1)(1976) (superceded).
1999]
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In 1943, within eleven months of the decision in Hess, President Roo-
sevelt signed the Senate's amendment into law.59 The new amendment
was thought to have achieved the proper balance between protecting the
honest informer and prohibiting parasitic litigation.6°
Over the next forty years, honest informers ended up having a harder
time utilizing the legislation than the congressmen envisioned.6' As it
turned out, courts construed the jurisdictional bar broadly.62 Whistle-
blowers who provided the government with evidence of a fraudulent
claim before they brought suit were barred from recovery.63 Addition-
ally, once a qui tam litigant failed the jurisdictional bar, he was barred
from any of the government's recovery.4
Furthermore, a litigant who lacked standing under the bar was pre-
vented from bringing a claim even if the government decided not to take
any action of its own.6' Noting that Congress specifically refused to in-
clude the "original source" provision, courts refused to make an excep-
tion for so-called honest informers." Now, instead of too many parasitic
suits, there were too few legitimate suits. 67 "[B]y restricting qui tam suits
by individuals who brought fraudulent activity to the government's atten-
tion, Congress had killed the goose that laid the golden egg and elimi-
nated the financial incentive to expose frauds against the government."'
59. See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 10-11.
60. See id. According to Senator Van Nuys, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee that proposed the amendments, the 1943 amendments were designed to "'protect[]
the honest informer as nearly we can do it by statute (and)... [do] not prevent an honest
informer from coming in."' Id. (quoting 89 CONG. REc. 7609 (1943)). Likewise, Repre-
sentative Kefauver stated, "'If the average, good American citizen... has the information
and he gives it to the Government, and the Government does not proceed in due course,
provision is made here where he can get some compensation."' Id. (quoting 89 CONG.
REC. 10,846 (1943)).
61. See id. (explaining how courts applied the law broadly, effectively restricting
whistleblowers from bringing suits).
62. See United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1153-54 (3d Cir. 1991).
63. See United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club, 105 F.3d 675,
680 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
64. See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 12 (reviewing court interpretations of
the jurisdictional bar).
65. See id. Once a plaintiff was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, he not only lost
his right to challenge government inaction, but also his right to object to settlements or
dismissals. See id.
66. See id.
67. See United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 650
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that after the 1943 amendments, courts greeted qui tam suits with
considerable caution).
68. Findley, 105 F.3d at 680; see also Hinshaw, supra note 3, at 275 (maintaining that
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The 1943 amendments resulted in a dramatic decline in qui tam litiga-
tion.69
This problem came to a head in the Seventh Circuit's opinion in United
States ex rel. Wisconsin (Department of Health and Social Services) v.
Dean. ° In Dean, the State of Wisconsin uncovered fraudulent Medicaid
claims and, as required by law, reported the fraud to the United States
Department of Health and Human Services. 71 The state then filed a qui
tam action against the offending parties. 72 The Seventh Circuit found
that Wisconsin failed to overcome the jurisdictional bar in the FCA be-
cause the state already had provided information to the federal govern-
ment.7' To add insult to injury, the federal government declined to inter-
vene in the case and filed a brief stating that Wisconsin should be the
proper relator.74 The court found that "[i]f the State of Wisconsin desires
a special exemption to the False Claims Act because of its requirement
to report Medicaid fraud to the federal government, then it should ask
Congress to provide the exemption.,
75
C. The 1986 Amendments
In response to Dean, the National Association of Attorneys General
adopted a resolution strongly urging Congress to amend the FCA to ad-
76dress the unfortunate result of this case. Among other things, the
resolution stated that prohibiting sovereign states from becoming qui tam
plaintiffs impairs the federal government's ability to detect and prosecute
the new qui tam provisions worked at cross-purposes with the government knowledge
bar).
69. See Springfield, 14 F.3d at 650 ("The new statutory barriers substantially de-
creased the use of qui tam provisions to enforce the FCA.... and courts greeted those qui
tam suits that did arise with considerable caution."); see also Hinshaw, supra note 3, at
275-76 (asserting that the new amendments rendered the FCA "a flaccid enforcement
tool").
70. 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984).
71. See id. at 1104.
72. See id. at 1102. Wisconsin's suit charged the defendant with 912 fraudulent claims
and demanded over two million dollars in damages on behalf of the United States Gov-
ernment. See id. In criminal court, the state only was able to get $13,285 in restitution.
See id.
73. See id. at 1103.
74. See id. at 1102-03 n.2 (discussing the United States' brief, which stated that Wis-
consin uncovered the fraud and was the proper party to pursue the action).
75. Id. at 1106. The court found that the plain language of the statute clearly prohib-
ited the suit, and that the arguments presented by the State were "'directed solely at what
the [state] thinks Congress should have done rather than what it did."' Id. at 1107 (quot-
ing United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 546-47 (1943)).
76. See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 13 (discussing the resolution adopted by
the National Association of Attorneys General in June of 1984).
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fraud.77 Again, Congress responded.7' This time the goal was "[s]eeking
the golden mean between adequate incentives for whistle-blowing insid-
ers with genuinely valuable information and discouragement of oppor-
tunistic plaintiffs who have no significant information to contribute of
their own . . . ,,79 As in 1943, Congress adopted the Senate version to
amend the FCA.8°
The stated purpose of the 1986 amendments was to enhance the fed-
eral government's ability to recoup losses sustained due to fraud.81 Con-
gress found that only a coordinated effort by the government and citizens
would curb the severe effects of false claims on the federal government."
To meet this end, Congress modified significantly the qui tam provisions
in the Act.83
Congress intended the revisions to correct the restrictive court inter-
pretations on qui tam jurisdictions and encourage would-be whistleblow-
ers to come forward. 5 In order to effectively fight fraud, the qui tam
provisions of the FCA had to invite private citizens to break the "con-
spiracy of silence" that permeated the government contract industry.6
By rewarding individuals who took the significant personal risk of ex-
posing fraud, Congress sought to make the FCA a more effective weapon
for the government.
77. See id.
78. See United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 650
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
79. Id. at 649.
80. See id. at 650-51.
81. See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 1.
82. See id. at 2 (stating that the assistance of the people is needed in order to curb the
widespread and sophisticated fraud).
83. See generally id. at 23-30 (explaining the modifications to 31 U.S.C. § 3730).
Changes include, among other things, increased civil and criminal fines, increased recover-
able damages, and clarification of the required mens rea. See id. at 2.
84. See id. at 4 (noting that restrictive court interpretations had thwarted the statute's
effectiveness).
85. See id. at 1-2.
86. See id. at 5. Hearings before Congress revealed that government auditors were
severely hampered by employee silence. See id. at 5-6. "[N]otice of an impending audit
normally travels through the contractor plant 'like wildfire' and 'everybody straightens up
their act."' Id. at 6.
87. See id. at 14. Testimony before Congress disclosed that potential whistleblowers
are inhibited from acting by fear of retaliation and a feeling that nothing will be done
anyway. See id. at 5. One whistleblower testified that his "ethical principles" were chal-
lenged when he discovered his company was defrauding the government. See id. As a tri-
ple-amputee with a wife, five children, and a home mortgage, he was inhibited from re-
porting the fraud by employer harassment and fear that "'no one inside or outside the
company [would be] willing to act on the information."' Id. (quoting Hearing on S. 1562,
[Vol. 49:247
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The amendments incorporated many new rights for relators. For ex-
ample, under the 1986 amendments, if the government takes over the
case, a relator can take a more active role in qui tam litigation and stay
abreast of the government's efforts."' Furthermore, the relator may be
entitled to a greater reward if the suit is successful. s9 Instead of twenty-
five percent of the recovery offered by the 1943 amendments, the new
amendments allow the qui tam plaintiff to recover up to thirty percent. 9°
Additionally, if the government takes over the suit, the qui tam plaintiff
is entitled to ten to twenty percent of the recovery, an increase from ten
percent in the 1943 amendments.9'
However, the 1986 amendments also place significant restrictions on
qui tam plaintiffs.2 For example, a qui tam plaintiff must provide a com-
plaint and all material evidence to the government before bringing the
suit.93 The government will keep the complaint under seal for sixty days
while it evaluates whether the suit will interfere with an ongoing investi-
gation and whether it wants to intervene.94 Congress designed this sec-
the False Claims Reform Act, before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Proce-
dure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1985)).
88. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c) (1994). While the government has the primary responsi-
bility for prosecuting a case, the qui tam plaintiff remains a party to the action. See id.
The government may not dismiss the action without the relator's consent unless the rela-
tor has had the opportunity for a hearing on the motion. See id. § 3730(c)(2)(A). The re-
lator's role in the litigation is limited, however, by certain restrictions. See id. § 3730(c)(2).
For example, the government may settle the case after a hearing finds the settlement to be
fair and reasonable. See id. § 3730(c)(2)(B). The government also retains the right to ask
the court to limit the relator's role if it can show that the relator's actions would be repeti-
tious, irrelevant, or would harass the defendant. See id. § 3730(c)(2)(C)-(D). Possible
limitations that may be imposed include limiting the witnesses the relator may call, limit-
ing the length of testimony, and limiting the relator's ability to cross-examine witnesses.
See id.
89. See id. § 3730(d). This increase is even more significant in light of the fact that
the government may recover treble damages (increased from double in past versions of
the law) as well as $5000 to $10,000 per fraudulent claim (increased from $2000). See id.
§ 3729(a).
90. Compare id. § 3730(d), with 31 U.S.C. § 232(E)(2) (1976) (superceded).
91. Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d), with 31 U.S.C. § 232(E)(1) (1976) (superceded).
The statute sets minimum recovery amounts of 10% or 25% depending on whether the
government intervenes. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). This is a change (the old law did not
have any minimums) incorporated to assure whistleblowers that they will be rewarded if
they take the risk to come forward. See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 28. Al-
though Congress acknowledged that such a rule may result in "inappropriate windfalls," it
justified the reward on the grounds that, without the relator's assistance, the government
may never have recovered any damages. See id.
92. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b), (e) (detailing requirements relators must meet to bring a
suit).
93. See id. § 3730(b)(2).
94. See id.; see also FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 23-24.
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tion to, among other things, allay Justice Department fears that increased
qui tam actions would cause interference with criminal investigations."
A second, and more important, restriction on qui tam litigation is the
new public disclosure bar." The public disclosure bar prohibits plaintiffs
from bringing suits based on information already in the government's
possession.9 It reads:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this sec-
tion based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transac-
tions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congres-
sional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office
report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media,
unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the per-
son bringing the action is an original source of the information.9,
Unlike the 1943 amendments, the 1986 amendments provide an excep-
tion to the jurisdictional bar if the relator is an "original source" of the
information. 99 An original source is defined as: "an individual who has
direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the alle-
gations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the
Government before filing an action under this section which is based on
the information.''1°°
The public disclosure bar of the 1986 amendments has resulted in ex-
tensive litigation and splits in the circuit courts as they try to determine
what Congress actually intended in creating the amendments. 10' The
overall analysis under the FCA is relatively simple: first, determine if the
95. See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 24 (reviewing Justice Department con-
cerns that the public filing of a qui tam suit may "tip off" targets of a federal investigation).
96. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4). Although the public disclosure bar has received the
most attention in the courts, there are three other jurisdiction bars in the FCA. See 31
U.S.C. § 3730(e)(1)-(5); see also Salcido, supra note 27, at 239 (discussing measures incor-
porated in the Act to help screen out cases that do not substantially benefit the govern-
ment). Other actions that are barred include suits brought by a service member against
another member of the armed forces acting in his official duties, actions brought against
members of Congress, the judiciary, or senior executive branch officials based on informa-
tion already known to the government, and actions brought which mirror the allegations in
suits in which the government is already a party. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(1)-(3).
97. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (barring jurisdiction when the government has al-
ready discovered the allegations or transactions in an official procedure, report, or investi-
gation or through the news media).
98. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (footnote omitted).
99. See id.
100. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
101. See United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club, 105 F.3d 675,
681 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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allegations are based on publicly disclosed material;"" and if so, assess
whether the plaintiff is an original source of the disclosure."3 Defining
the words in the statute, however, is not so simple. The circuits have
come up with different and conflicting interpretations of various ele-
ments of the public disclosure bar including what the words "based
upon," "public disclosure," "original source," and "information" mean.104
II. WHO Is ALLOWED TO BRING A Qul TAM SUIT: How THE COURTS
HAVE INTERPRETED THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE BAR
When interpreting the public disclosure bar, courts have relied heavily
on the legislative history of the False Claims Act.'9 In doing so, judges
have attempted to balance the Act's twin goals,0° namely, discouraging
what they perceive to be parasitic suits while encouraging legitimate
whistleblowers to come forward. 1' Using these goals as a guide, the cir-
cuits have struggled to resolve several interpretive questions including
102. See id.
103. See id. If the answer to the first question is negative, then the public disclosure
bar does not apply and there is no need to proceed to the question of whether or not the
relator is an original source. See id.
104. See id.
105. See generally United States ex rel. McKenzie v. Bellsouth Telecomm. Inc., 123
F.3d 935 (6th Cir. 1997); Findley, 105 F.3d 675; United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes
Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512 (9th Cir. 1995); United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson
& Co., 21 F.3d 1339 (4th Cir. 1994); United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d
318 (2d Cir. 1992); United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1991).
106. See United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514,
1519-20 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that the twin goals of the FCA are to encourage whistle-
blowers to expose fraud and prevent opportunists from bringing suits based on informa-
tion already in the public domain); see also McKenzie, 123 F.3d at 942-43 (stating that
"[tihe purpose of the qui tam provisions of the FCA is to encourage private individuals
who are aware of fraud ... to bring such information forward" and to prevent parasitic
suits based on information previously disclosed to the government); Siller, 21 F.3d at 1347
(observing that Congress intended the qui tam provisions to allow private citizens to help
curtail fraud while, at the same time, prevent parasitic suits in which the relators bring no
new information to the case); United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., v. Quinn,
14 F.3d 645, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that the twin goals of the qui tam provi-
sions are rejecting suits the government could have brought on its own and promoting
suits the government is incapable of bringing on its own); Doe, 960 F.2d at 321 ("The 1986
amendments attempt to strike a balance between encouraging private citizens to expose
fraud and avoiding parasitic actions by opportunists who attempt to capitalize on public
information without seriously contributing to the disclosure of the fraud."); Stinson, 944
F.2d at 1154 (concluding that the principal intent of the 1986 amendments was to limit
parasitic suits like Hess while encouraging suits by persons with first hand knowledge of
the wrongdoing).
107. See supra note 106 (listing cases analyzing the purpose of the qui tam provisions);
see also Hinshaw, supra note 3, at 276 (discussing the purpose of the 1986 amendments).
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what constitutes public disclosure; when is information based upon a
public disclosure;1 9 and who qualifies as an original source."'
A. Actual Versus Theoretical Disclosure
According to the FCA, if allegations are revealed in a "criminal, civil,
or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Govern-
ment Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from
the news media," they are publicly disclosed."' Although courts broadly
112interpret what types of disclosures fall into these categories, they dis-
pute how accessible the information must be to the public in order to
trigger the jurisdictional bar. This dispute is centered around whether
information has to be actually revealed to the public or whether it need
only be theoretically capable of being acquired by the public."'
In United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Pru-
108. See discussion infra notes 111-42 and accompanying text (discussing whether ac-
tual or theoretical public disclosure is required). The circuits are also split on whether to
include disclosure to an innocent employee of the company charged with fraud as a disclo-
sure to the public. See Schumer, 63 F.3d at 1518 (stating that there is no principled distinc-
tion between disclosures made to government employees and those made to employees of
defense contractors and subcontractors); Doe, 960 F.2d at 323 (stating that there is no
principled reason not to treat government contractor employees as members of the pub-
lic).
109. See discussion infra notes 143-69 and accompanying text (explaining judicial in-
terpretations of the phrase "based upon").
110. See discussion infra notes 170-214 (comparing various judicial interpretations of
the original source provision).
111. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1994) (footnote omitted). Courts have applied the
expressio unius doctrine to conclude that this is an exhaustive list of the types of materials
and hearings that can trigger the jurisdictional bar. See Salcido, supra note 27, at 266 (ar-
guing that several courts have incorrectly applied the doctrine to limit the possible sources
of public disclosure under the jurisdictional bar).
112. See United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1155 (3d Cir. 1991) (interpreting the word "hearing" to incorporate
more than just formal proceedings; it includes any information disclosed in connection
with criminal, civil, or administrative litigation); see also United States ex rel. Springfield
Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1994). ("It is clear from the statu-
tory context that the term 'hearing' was intended to apply in a broad context of legal pro-
ceedings under § 3730(e)(4)(A)."); Hinshaw, supra note 3, at 279 (noting that "civil hear-
ing" has been read to include all proceedings in a civil lawsuit). But see United States ex
rel. Dunleavy v. County of Delaware, 123 F.3d 734, 745 (3d Cir. 1997) (narrowly constru-
ing the statute to rule out state administrative reports); United States ex reL Williams v.
NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1500 (11th Cir. 1991) (narrowly construing the list of possible
sources of public disclosure).
113. See United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514,
1519 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing split in the circuits over the sufficiency of actual versus
theoretical disclosure).
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dential Insurance Co.,114 the Third Circuit decided that incriminating
memos acquired during the discovery process but not filed with the court
constituted public disclosure.115 The court found that discovery material
that was not subject to any relevant court-imposed limitation was pub-
licly disclosed regardless of whether the parties filed the discovery mate-
rial."' The Third Circuit focused not on whether the documents were ac-
tually filed, but, rather, on whether they could be filed 17  The court
rejected the argument that the public would not be able to inspect freely
information not filed with the court, and, therefore, it was not publicly
disclosed u 8
The Third Circuit cited two reasons for its decision. 19 First, although
various district courts developed individualized rules pertaining to what
should and should not be filed, most did not preclude access to the non-
120filed materials by interested parties. Second, it is improper to apply the
public disclosure bar differently depending on the form of discovery and
the rules of the individual district.12 ' Thus, material is publicly disclosed
as long as it theoretically could be disclosed.
This view has been rejected in other circuits.' In United States ex rel.
114. 944 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1991).
115. See id. at 1158. These memos formed that basis for the plaintiff's qui tam suit.
See id. at 1151-52.
116. See id. at 1157-58. The court reasoned that because discovery is part of a civil
hearing, information gleaned from the discovery process was, therefore, publicly disclosed.
See id. This logical progression is followed by most courts taking an expansive view of the
word "hearing." See generally United States ex rel. McKenzie v. Bellsouth Telecomm.
Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 939 (6th Cir. 1997); Federal Recovery Serv., Inc. v. United States, 72
F.3d 447, 450 (5th Cir. 1995).
117. See Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1159.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 1158-59.
120. See id. at 1158. The court goes on to note that some districts have the authority to
order the filing of discovery materials when any person with a genuine interest in reading
the material makes a request. See id.
121. See id. at 1159. Currently, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require all discov-
ery material to be filed unless the court grants an exception. See id.; see also FED. R. Civ.
P. 5(d) (providing that all papers that are required to be served upon a party must be filed
with the court unless the court has issued an order to the contrary). In 1978, the Advisory
Committee considered changing the rule to reduce the amount of discovery material filed
but decided that the information may be useful to the general public. See Stinson, 944
F.2d at 1159.
122. See Stinson, 944 F.2d at 1159 ("[W]e look not to whether the specific documents
must be or have been filed but whether there is a recognition that they can be filed and
hence available for public access.").
123. See United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514,
1519 (10th Cir. 1996).
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Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp. ,124 the Tenth Circuit ruled that
theoretical disclosure alone is insufficient to constitute public disclo-
sure."' This case involved fraudulent Medicaid claims submitted by Cen-
tury Healthcare Corporation (CHC).126 The plaintiff, Ramseyer, and the
Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS) both discovered the
defendant's illegal activities in completely separate investigations. 12' Al-
though the DHS issued a report detailing CHC's fraudulent claims, only
three copies were made; DHS kept two copies and one went to CHC.'1
Nobody distributed any copies of the report to the public; however, the
report was available upon written request and subsequent approval by
DHS lawyers.29 When Ramseyer brought her qui tam suit, the district
court concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because
the DHS report constituted public disclosure.'O
The Tenth Circuit found that the report was not publicly disclosed.'
Rejecting the approach used in Stinson, the court ruled that, for pur-
poses of the FCA, information must be affirmatively disclosed to the
public in order to be treated as in the public domain.'33 In coming to this
conclusion, the court considered the twin goals of the qui tam provisions.
First, the court said an "actual disclosure" requirement encourages le-
gitimate suits by private citizens with first-hand knowledge.'3 By limiting
124. 90 F.3d 1514 (10th Cir. 1996).
125. See id. at 1519 (finding that "public disclosure" signifies more than the mere theo-
retical or potential availability of information).
126. See id. at 1517.
127. See id. The plaintiff became aware of the fraud in her capacity as a consultant
and clinical director of a mental health facility operated by CHC. See id. The DHS, on
the other hand, discovered the infractions through a routine audit and inspection. See id
128. See id. The report contained essentially the same allegations as Mrs. Ramseyer's
suit. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id. CHC argued that the report was publicly disclosed because 1) theoreti-
cally, the public could have access to it, and 2) the information was disclosed to a stranger
of the fraud. See id. at 1521. At least one court has found that public disclosure happens
whenever anyone who is not a potential witness or target of the fraud probe is told about
the fraud. See United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 323 (2d Cir.
1992). This interpretation is disputed in Ramseyer, which found that an independent in-
vestigation by an entity does not, itself, constitute public disclosure unless that information
is affirmatively provided to another party. See Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1521.
131. See Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1521.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 114-22 (discussing the Third Circuit's view
that theoretically disclosed material may be considered publicly disclosed for the purposes
of the public disclosure bar).
133. See Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1519 ("'[P]ublic disclosure' signifies more than the mere
theoretical or potential availability of information.").
134. See id. at 1520 (noting that one of the purposes of the FCA is to encourage the
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what is considered to be in the public domain, it is easier for a private
party to bring a suit based on generally unknown information. 135 Thus, it
encourages the exposure of fraudulent activities and prevents govern-
ment inaction from "throw[ing] a cloak of secrecy" around the allega-
tions.136 Second, an "actual disclosure" requirement does not encourage
parasitic suits. 37 According to the court, an opportunist qui tam plaintiff
would have to know the material exists before he could take advantage
of it.138 Because the material in question is information that has not been
widely distributed, it is unlikely that this rule would cause parasitic
suits.
139
Most other circuits have employed the same reasoning as the Tenth
Circuit when addressing this issue.14' The Ninth Circuit concluded that
information theoretically available under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) is not publicly disclosed until it is actually requested and re-
ceived by a member of the public.'4 ' The D.C. Circuit flatly rejected Stin-
exposure of fraud).
135. See id. The court also noted that the 1986 amendments shifted the focus from
what the government had in its files to what was actually disclosed. See id. Employing a
theoretical disclosure standard to bar a qui tam claim would effectively reinstate the pre-
1986 "government knowledge" bar. See id. (citing United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-
Ferguson Co., 861 F. Supp. 1544, 1551 (D.N.M. 1994)).
136. See id. One reason given by Congress for revising the FCA in 1986 was "to prod
the government into action, rather than allowing it to sit on, and possibly suppress, allega-
tions of fraud when inaction might seem to be in the interest of the government." United
States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 323 (2d Cir. 1992); see also FCA
AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 24-26 (finding that by enacting certain provisions, Con-
gress intended that the government should not be able to delay or suppress fraud litiga-
tion).
137. See Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1520 (finding that information not yet in the public eye
cannot be the basis for a parasitic suit because the relator must still do research in order to
bring the facts out).
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 1519 (comparing the circuit court cases that have dealt with actual ver-
sus theoretical distinctions). Of the four circuits that have addressed the issue, three have
required actual disclosure: the Ninth, in United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft
Co., 63 F.3d 1512 (9th Cir. 1995); the Tenth, in United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century
Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514 (10th Cir. 1996); and the D.C. Circuit, in United States ex
rel. Springfield Terminal Railway. Co., 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Only one circuit has
found theoretical disclosure to be sufficient: the Third Circuit, in United States ex rel. Stin-
son v. Prudential Insurance Co., 944 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1991).
141. See Schumer, 63 F.3d at 1519-20. The Schumer court gave two reasons for its de-
cision. First, the court looked to the Supreme Court's ruling in Consumer Product Safety
Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980), finding that information is not
publicly disclosed within the meaning of the Consumer Product Safety Act unless a spe-
cific FOIA request has been initiated and responded to. See Schumer, 63 F.3d at 1520.
Second, the government reviews all FOIA requests and may not release information
which requires continued protection. See id. Therefore, it is unknown whether particular
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son by finding that discovery material must be filed with the court in or-der o be. • 141
der to be considered publicly disclosed.
B. When is Information "Based Upon" Publicly Disclosed Material?
The circuits are also split on interpreting the statutory phrase "based
upon the public disclosure of allegations., 14 Here, the issue is whether
"based upon" should mean "derived from" or "substantially similar to."
United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,'" a Forth Circuit
decision, is the leading case holding that "based upon" means "derived
from.' 141 In Siller, Scientific Supply, Inc. (SSI) sued its supplier of medi-
cal device products, Becton Dickinson & Co. (BD), alleging BD wrong-
fully terminated their contract because it feared SSI would reveal that
BD was overcharging the government.1 46 Although the case eventually
settled, David Siller, an employee of SSI and the brother of the presi-
dent, filed a qui tam suit alleging essentially the same claims that were
alleged in the SSI suit. 47 Siller asserted that he did not learn of BD's il-
licit activities through SSI's lawsuit; instead, he claimed that he learned
of the activity through his employment. 8
The court reviewed the statute using a straightforward textual analy-
sis.149 Turning to Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986),
the court found "based upon" means to "use as a basis for."'"5 Therefore,
a qui tam action is only "based upon" a public disclosure when the rela-
tor actually derives his information straight from that disclosure. 1 The
information may be available under the FOIA until a request has been made. See id.
142. See United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 652
(D.C. Cir. 1994). According to the court, discovery materials that are not filed are only
potentially within the public eye. See id. at 653. The court stated that "[i]f they are not yet
in the public eye, no rational purpose is served-and no 'parasitism' deterred-by pre-
venting a qui tam plaintiff from bringing suit based on their contents." Id.
143. Compare, e.g., United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339
(4th Cir. 1994), with United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employee's Club, 105
F.3d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
144. 21 F.3d 1339 (4th Cir. 1994).
145. See id. at 1349; see also Salcido, supra note 27, at 275 (noting that Siller is the
leading case interpreting "based upon" as "derived from").
146. See Siller, 21 F.3d at 1341.
147. See id. Although the settlement agreement bound Ruben Siller, the president of
SSI, to confidentiality, it did not bind David Siller, the plaintiff. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 1348 ("Section 3730(e)(4)(A)'s use of the phrase 'based upon' is, we be-
lieve, susceptible of a straightforward textual exegesis.").
150. See id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 180
(1986)). The court could not find any common or dictionary interpretation of the phrase
that would allow it to mean "supported by." See id. at 1349.
151. See id. at 1348. The court dismissed the conflicting interpretations in other cir-
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Fourth Circuit found this reading of the statute consistent with Congress'
intention of preventing parasitic claims.152 According to the court, "it is
self-evident that a suit that includes allegations that happen to be similar
(even identical) to those already publicly disclosed, but were not actually
derived from those public disclosures, simply is not, in any sense, para-
sitic."'
The D.C. Circuit contended in United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-
Boron Employees' Club"' that "based upon" means "substantially similar
to." In Findley, the relator brought a suit which alleged fraudulent activ-
ity similar to what was already alleged in a 1952 Comptroller General
Opinion and the legislative history of the Randolph-Sheppard Act.'
The D.C. Circuit considered and explicitly rejected Siller."'
Findley found the term "based upon" to be ambiguous and, thus,
turned to the legislative history for guidance. 5 7 Consequently, the court
found the Fourth Circuit's interpretation to be in error.5 8 The D.C. Cir-
cuit reasoned that Siller misconstrued the intent of Congress when it
stated that suits derived from information identical to publicly disclosed
information are not parasitic.5 9 Instead, the D.C. Circuit held that Con-
gress intended to bar qui tam actions when the relator has not brought
any significant independent information to the suit. 6° The qui tam provi-
sions were an attempt to "'encourag[e] whistleblowing and discourag[e]
opportunistic behavior.'
161
cuits. See id. at 1349. Finding that the other circuits either did not properly address the
question yet or did not properly support their position, it stated:
Preferring the plain meaning of the words enacted by Congress over our sister
Circuits' as-yet unconsidered assumptions as to the meaning of those words, and
over the Second Circuit's considered but unsupported interpretation, we hold
that Siller's action was only "based upon" the disclosures in the SSI lawsuit if
Siller actually derived his allegations against BD from the SSI complaint.
Id.
152. See id.
153. Id. at 1348. Although no other circuit has adopted the Fourth Circuit's standard,
a similar approach was taken in a district court in the First Circuit. See United States ex
rel. LaValley v. First Nat'l Bank, 707 F. Supp. 1351, 1367 (D. Mass. 1988) (finding informa-
tion in suit was not based upon a publicly disclosed source because it was acquired as the
result of an independent investigation).
154. 105 F.3d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
155. See id. at 685.
156. See id. at 682-85.
157. See id. at 682.
158. See id. at 682-83.
159. See id. at 683.
160. See id. at 684.
161. Id. at 683 (quoting United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14
F.3d 645, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
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The D.C. Circuit noted also that interpreting "based upon" to mean
"derived from" renders the original source requirement of the qui tam
provisions largely superfluous.162 The statute states that if a relator brings
a suit based on publicly disclosed information, he must be an original
source."' An original source must provide the information to the gov-
ernment and have obtained the information independently of the public•164
disclosure. Using the Fourth Circuit definition of "based upon," an un-
scrupulous relator could read about a fraudulent transaction in the local
newspaper and conduct his own investigation and then claim that, al-
though the information was publicly disclosed, his allegations are not
based upon that information. Thus, he would not have to meet the
original source requirements.'6 6 Such an erroneous result is avoided by
"[u]sing 'based upon' as a proxy for whether the relator's complaint
merely parrots what is already in the public domain.' 67 This test "leads
logically to a subsidiary inquiry into whether the relator had obtained the
information in the complaint independently prior to the disclosure and so
is an 'original source. '  The majority of other circuits have come to the
same conclusion as Findley.
169
C. The Original Source Provision and Public Disclosure
Like the public disclosure provision of the False Claims Act, the origi-
nal source provision has been the subject of conflicting court interpreta-
162. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 683.
163. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1994).
164. See id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
165. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 683.
166. See id. (recognizing that the Fourth Circuit's interpretation swallows the original
source exception).
167. Findley, 105 F.3d at 683.
168. Id.
169. See United States ex rel. Biddle v. Board of Trustees, 147 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir.
1998) (believing that the Fourth Circuit's interpretation does not further either of the twin
goals of the False Claims Act); United States ex rel. McKenzie v. Bellsouth Telecomm.,
Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 940 (6th Cir. 1997) (observing that interpreting "based upon" to mean
"supported by" is consistent with the purpose of the False Claims Act); see also United
States ex rel. Fine v. MK-Ferguson Co., 99 F.3d 1538, 1545 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that
when allegations are "substantially identical" to publicly disclosed information, the allega-
tions are considered to be "based upon" the publicly disclosed information); Federal Re-
covery Servs., Inc. v. United States, 72 F.3d 447, 451 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that a qui tam
plaintiff may not avoid the jurisdictional bar by adding claims that are substantially similar
to information that has been publicly disclosed); Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Florida, Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 567 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that "based upon" is defined as
"supported by"); United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 324 (2d Cir.
1992) (concluding that public disclosure of allegations divests courts of jurisdiction re-
gardless of where a relator obtained his information).
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tions.17° At the heart of this issue is the original source's relationship with
the publicly disclosed information."' The courts are split three ways:
some require the original source to be the source of the public disclo-
sure;72 some state that it does not matter who discloses the information
or when the original source brings the information to the government's
attention;173 and some require the original source to disclose the informa-
tion before it is disclosed publicly.74
In United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co.,17 1 the Second
Circuit found that a qui tam plaintiff must be the source of the public dis-
176closure. To reach this conclusion, the court examined the meaning ofthe word "information" in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) in relationship to
170. Compare United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 16-
18 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that an original source must be the source of the public disclo-
sure), with United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1351-55
(4th Cir. 1994) (finding that it does not matter who discloses the information or when the
original source brings the information to the government's attention), with United States
ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employee's Club, 105 F.3d 675, 688-91 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(finding that an original source must disclose the information, before it is publicly dis-
closed).
171. See infra notes 172-77 and accompanying text (discussing differences among the
circuits interpreting the original source provision).
172. See Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a qui
tam plaintiff must have played a role in disclosing the allegations); see also United States
ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that an
original source must be the one that disclosed the allegations to the entity that disclosed
the information to the public).
173. See United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-Ferguson Co., 99 F.3d 1538, 1548 n.2 (10th
Cir. 1996) (declining to adopt a requirement that the original source be a source to the dis-
closing entity); Cooper v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 568 n.13
(11th Cir. 1994) (stating that the added requirement found in Long Island Lighting im-
poses an undue burden on would-be relators); United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dick-
inson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1355 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[A] qui tam plaintiff need not be a source
to the entity that publicly disclosed the allegations on which the qui tam action is based in
order to be an original source .... ).
174. See United States ex rel. McKenzie v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 123 F.3d 935,
942 (6th Cir. 1997) ("to be an original source, a relator must inform the government of the
alleged fraud before the information has been publicly disclosed," but that one does not
have to be a source to the "world at large"); see also United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-
Boron Employees' Club, 105 F.3d 675, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that there is no re-
quirement that an original source be a source to the disclosing entity, however, he must
provide the information to the government prior to any public disclosure).
175. 912 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1990).
176. See id. at 16. According to Long Island Lighting, there are three requirements
that must be met in order to qualify as an original source: 1) the relator must have direct
and independent knowledge of the allegations, 2) the relator must voluntarily provide the
information to the government before filing suit, and 3) the relator must "have directly or
indirectly been a source to the entity that publicly disclosed the allegations on which a suit
is based." Id.
Catholic University Law Review
the word "information" in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B).'" In evaluating
I (4)(B), the court emphasized that the word "information" is modified
by the phrase "on which the allegations are based" and, therefore, means
the information used to bring a qui tam suit.171 In I (4)(A), however, the
court found that the word "information" means the information that has
been publicly disclosed. 7 9 Thus, an original source must comply with the
two requirements of (4)(B), namely, the party must have direct and in-
dependent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are
based, and must voluntarily provide the information to the government
prior to filing his suit."O In addition, the original source must also meet a
third requirement established in (4)(A): he must be the source to the
entity that publicly disclosed the information.
1 81
According to the Second Circuit, such a construction supports the
goals of the False Claims Act. 182 To support its position, the court cited
portions of the Congressional Record indicating that legislators closely
involved in the 1986 amendments intended qui tam plaintiffs to be the
source of the public disclosure of fraudulent transactions.8 8 The court
also found that its interpretation would promote the Act's goal of en-
couraging whistleblowers to come forward.' 4 Because the rule bars indi-
viduals from using information already in the public domain, potential
177. See id. The court found that "various facts cumulatively suggest.., that the word
'information' is not intended to mean the same in § 3730(e)(4)(A) as it does in
§ 3730(e)(4)(B)." Id.
178. See id. at 16-17. The court supplied three reasons for this conclusion. See id.
First, any other reading of (4)(A) would make its use of "information" superfluous. See
id. at 16. Second, the court found that the modification in (4)(B) and the lack of modifi-
cation in (4)(A) indicated that the word "information" must have different meanings in
the different paragraphs. See id. at 16-17. Finally, the court found that the "most natural
reading" of the word in (4)(A) indicated that it referred to the information that was
publicly disclosed. See id. at 17.
179. See id. at 17.
180. See id. at 16.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 17-18 (discussing the legislative intent of the FCA and various state-
ments by supporters of the 1986 amendments).
183. See id. at 17. The court noted that Representative Berman, a co-drafter of the
1986 amendments, stated that to qualify as an original source, one must have "'had some
of the information related to the claim which he made available to the government or the
news media in advance of the false claims being publicly disclosed."' Id. (quoting 132
CONG. REC. H9389 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986)). The court also referred to comments made
by Senator Grassley, who introduced the legislation in the Senate. Id. He stated that a
relator was barred from bringing a suit if he "'had not been an original source to the entity
that disclosed the allegations."' Id. (quoting 132 CONG. REC. S20536 (daily ed. August 11,
1986)) (emphasis added by the court).
184. See id. at 18.
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relators are encouraged to come forward as quickly as possible."'
Agreeing with the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, in Wang v. FMC
Corp.,18 also found that such an interpretation fits most logically into the
history of the False Claims Act.' 87 According to Wang, when Congress
enacted the 1986 amendments, it wanted what it thought it had in 1943-
"a law requiring that the relator be the original source of the govern-
ment's information."' 88 Thus, the 1986 amendments were intended only
to correct opinions like Dean so that the whistleblower would still be eli-.. 189
gible to bring an action. In the Ninth Circuit's view, the qui tam provi-
sions are intended only to encourage insiders to blow the whistle; there-
fore, plaintiffs who are not the actual source of the public disclosure need
not be rewarded.' 90
The second school of thought is represented in United States ex rel.
Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co..'9' Here, the Fourth Circuit found that a
relator is not responsible for disclosing the information, nor is he respon-
sible for bringing it to the Government's attention before it reaches the
public domain.9' In Siller, the court found that I (4)(B) establishes the
exclusive criteria to qualify as an original source.'9 According to Siller,
the proper way to read (4)(A) and I (4)(B) together is:
[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action.., based upon
the public disclosure of allegations ... in a ... civil ... hearing
S.. unless ... the person bringing the action.., has direct and
independent knowledge of the information on which the allega-
185. See id. (noting that the interpretation encourages whistleblowers to break the
"conspiracy of silence").
186. 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992).
187. See id. at 1418.
188. Id. at 1419 (emphasis in original). The court found that the 1986 amendments
were remedial and not innovative. See id.
189. See id. (finding no evidence that Congress intended to do anything but correct
Dean, and some evidence that it meant to do even less).
190. See id. ("[Tihere is little point in rewarding a second toot.").
191. 21 F.3d 1339 (4th Cir. 1994).
192. See id. at 1355 (discussing the original source provision).
193. See id. at 1351. The Fourth Circuit found that the Second Circuit attempted to
glean support for its position by creating an ambiguity in an otherwise clear statute. See
id. at 1352 & 1353 nn.12-13. It went on to note that the statements by Senator Grassley
and Representative Berman relied upon by the Second Circuit were made prior to signifi-
cant changes to the provisions. See id. at 1353. "The media" was dropped as a possible
disclosing entity indicating that Congress did not intend for a plaintiff to provide informa-
tion to this source. See id. In addition, the statute was changed to require an original
source to provide information to the government before filing suit instead of before the
government files suit. See id. This indicates that a relator can bring suit after the suit is
publicly disclosed by a government action. See id.
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tions are based and has voluntarily provided the information to
the Government before filing an action under this section which
is based on the information. S4
Thus, the Fourth Circuit's interpretation does not include the Second
Circuit's "additional, extra-textual requirement that was not intended by
Congress."'95 Addressing the Second Circuit's contention that giving the
same meaning to the word "information" in both I (4)(A) and (4)(B)
would make its use in (4)(A) superfluous, Siller states that the distinc-
tion is hyper-technical, and that it is unlikely Congress would even have•• 196
noticed the repetition. The court concluded that the redundancy is so
minor that it does not warrant ascribing different meanings to the
words.'9
Siller further states that the fact that Congress sought to correct Dean
provides no support whatsoever for Wang's conclusion.19 8  The 1943
amendments barred only suits based upon information already in the
government's hands.99 In order to remedy Dean-like cases, Congress
merely had to ensure that the person bringing the information to the
government would not be barred; according to the court, Congress ac-
complished this by the original source provisions.2°° Thus, Wang wrongly
assumed that to correct Dean, the plaintiff had to provide information,
not just to the government, but also to the disclosing entity.2'
The third school of thought among the circuits is that, although an
original source does not have to provide information to the disclosing en-
tity, the person does have to come forward before the information is
194. Id. at 1351 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (1994)) (emphasis added by the court).
195. Id.
196. See id. at 1352.
197. See id. The court further stated that the modifying phrase, "on which the allega-
tions are based," supports the conclusion that the word "information" has only one
meaning in § 3730(e)(4). See id. Because the only allegations referenced in the section are
those publicly disclosed, the modifying phrase indicates that the word "information" in
I (4)(B) means the information on which the publicly disclosed allegations are based. See
id. This is the same conclusion reached by the Second Circuit interpreting the word "in-
formation" referred to in 4(A). See id.
198. See id. at 1354.
199. See id. The decision in Dean had nothing to do with barring suits based on infor-
mation disclosed to the general public. See id. The 1943 amendments bar qui tam suits
only if they are "'based upon evidence or information in the possession of the United
States."' Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1976) (superceded)) (emphasis added by the
court).
200. See id. at 1354 (noting that the original source provision exempts relators from
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publicly disclosed.'O The D.C. Circuit explained the rationale for this in-
terpretation in Findley.2 0 3 Like Siller, the D.C. Circuit simply noted that
§ 3730(e)(4)(B) only contemplates an original source as a source to the
government, not to any other entity.20' Therefore, there is no additional
requirement that the relator provide the information to the disclosing en-
tity.'
The Findley court's ruling differed, however, from the Fourth Circuit's
because it found that an original source must provide the information be-
fore it is publicly disclosed.2  The Findley court asserted that such an in-
terpretation fixes the holding in Dean by protecting informants who
bring suits. 2° This interpretation also serves the goal of limiting parasitic
suits by barring claims based on old information that has already been
disclosed.208 Once the information is in the public domain, the court
found that the qui tam provisions were no longer necessary for the gov-
ernment to rely on private citizens to bring qui tam suits.2
The Sixth Circuit agreed with the D.C. Circuit in United States ex rel.
McKenzie v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc."o In McKenzie, the
court based its decision largely on the twin goals of the False Claims
Act.21' The McKenzie court approved of the D.C. Circuit's interpretation
202. See supra note 172 (listing cases finding that an original source must provide his
information to the government before it is publicly disclosed).
203. See United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club, 105 F.3d 675,
688-91 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (discussing judicial interpretations of the original source provi-
sion).
204. See id. at 690. Such a reading avoids a potentially unfair result in a case where a
relator volunteers new, independently acquired information to the government but is
barred from bringing his suit because the media subsequently discovers and reports the
allegations. Cf. id.
205. See id.
206. See id. The court rejected the Fourth Circuit's analysis which merged the original
source provision with the public disclosure provision. See id. at 691. According to Findley,
the only reading of the statute that accounts for the requirement that an "original
source" voluntarily provide information to the government before filing suit, and
Congress' decision to use the term "original source" rather than simply incorpo-
rating [the original source provision] into [the public disclosure provision], is one
that requires an original source to provide the information to the government
prior to any public disclosure.
Id.
207. See id.
208. See id. (determining that there is no incentive to protect relators that bring infor-
mation that has already been publicly disclosed).
209. See id.
210. 123 F.3d 935 (6th Cir. 1997).
211. See id. at 942-43 (asserting that the court's conclusion is based upon the plain
meaning of the Act as well as Congress' purpose in amending the Act).
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because it promotes legitimate qui tam litigation by encouraging plain-
tiffs to come forward as soon as possible and discouraging potential rela-
tors from sitting on the information2 Furthermore, this approach helps
discourage people from feeding off previously disclosed information and
filing the parasitic lawsuits that prompted Congress to change the law in
1943.213 The Sixth Circuit found that only a true whistleblower--
someone who actually alerts the Government to fraud-should be re-
warded.214
III. DEFINING THE LINE BETWEEN THE TWIN GOALS
The qui tam provisions of the FCA represent Congress' attempt to
balance conflicting interests,215 and the statute should be interpreted with
this goal in mind. Each of the circuit court splits identified above, shifts
the balance one way or the other.2" The goal of the courts, however,
must be to take the jurisdictional bar as a whole and define the delicate
line that rewards whistleblowers with valuable information and thwarts
opportunists.
A. Limiting Application of the Bar Only to Information That is Actually
Disclosed
The issue over theoretical versus actual disclosure is one of the essen-
tial hurdles that may confront a qui tam plaintiff.217 By showing that the
information was not in the public domain, the plaintiff can avoid the ad-
ditional burdens of showing that the information was not based on the
publicly disclosed information or demonstrating that s/he is an original
218source.
Although the Third Circuit purports to take a commonsense ap-
212. See id. at 943. The court found that this interpretation is more consistent with the
Act's goal of alerting the government to fraud because it encourages the whistleblower to
give the information to the government, as opposed to any other entity that might release
it into the public domain. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id. (finding that it would be contrary to the purpose of the statute to allow
"the individual who sits on the sidelines while others disclose the allegations" to reap any
reward from a qui tam suit).
215. See supra note 106 (listing cases analyzing the purpose of the qui tam provisions).
216. See supra notes 111-214 and accompanying text (discussing how the circuits have
balanced the twin goals of the FCA).
217. See United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 651
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
218. See id. The first step in the analysis of the jurisdictional bar is to determine if the
information relied upon by the plaintiff has been disclosed to the public. See id. If it has
not, then the test stops there and the jurisdictional bar is not applied. See id.
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.219proach, by barring actions based upon information that could poten-
tially be disclosed,22° it erects a potentially significant obstacle to legiti-
mate qui tam suits. The Third Circuit did not want public disclosure to
221turn on what form of discovery takes place and local district filing rules.
Although attempting to apply a universal standard not subject to the in-
dividual practices of local courts may be useful; in this instance, it is mis-
guided.
The purpose of the public disclosure bar is to prevent parasitic suits
and to stop the "race to the courthouse" once information has been re-
leased to the public.222 If information has not yet reached the public eye,
then there is no reason to prevent the litigation.223 As the D.C. Circuit
224stated in United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Railway v. Quinn, a
suit that is based upon information that has not actually been disclosed
cannot be deemed parasitic because the government has an interest in
bringing the case into the light.2z Until the government is given actual
knowledge of a fraud, the fraud cannot be remedied and the purpose of
the FCA will be frustrated.
The majority view that an affirmative action should be required in or-
der for information to be publicly disclosed 226 is the more sensible rule.
The rule does not encourage parasitism because a relator basing a claim
on information that is only theoretically disclosed must first have knowl-
edge that the information exists, and then conduct an investigation to un-
cover it.217 As the Ninth Circuit noted in United States ex rel. Schumer v.
219. See United States ex reL Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1161 (3d Cir. 1991) (opining that the court's interpretation is a "practi-
cal, commonsense" reading of the congressional intent behind the jurisdictional bar).
220. See id. at 1159 (noting that the court looks not to whether disclosure documents
have been filed, but rather to whether they can be filed).
221. See id. at 1158-59.
222. See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 10-12 (articulating the government's
concern with an FCA that contains no jurisdictional bar). The first jurisdictional bar was
added in 1943 as a direct response to Attorney General Francis Biddle's concerns over
these issues. See id.
223. See United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 653
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
224. 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
225. See id. at 653. "To bar a qui tam suit under these circumstances would prevent
the utilization for enforcement purposes of allegations or transactions that may not other-
wise come to the attention of the authorities." Id.
226. See supra note 140 (describing the various approaches that the circuits have taken
on this issue).
227. See United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century. Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514,
1520 (10th Cir. 1996). "If a specific report detailing instances of fraud is not affirmatively
disclosed, but rather is simply ensconced in an obscure government file, an opportunist qui
19991
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Hughes Aircraft Co.,2 although some of the pieces of the puzzle may
lurk in hidden government file cabinets and may be potentially available
through FOIA requests, this should not be a bar to a relator exposing a
fraud."9 Furthermore, the rule helps bring fraud to light by preventing
government inaction that would allow the information to remain hid-
den.m As the Tenth Circuit observed, it takes a positive act of disclosure
to the public to prevent the government from obscuring the allegations in
a "cloak of secrecy."3' In such situations, the qui tam provisions are at
their best-uncovering fraud and forcing remedial action.
B. Interpreting "Based Upon"
How a court interprets the phrase "based upon" may have the single
largest impact on the outcome of the FCA analysis.32 Even if informa-
tion has been publicly disclosed, anyone can still bring a qui tam action as• • 233
long as it is not based on that information. The majority of the circuits
have correctly given the phrase a broad interpretation to include infor-
mation that is "substantially similar to" publicly disclosed allegations or
234transactions.
Although the interpretation adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Siller
may encourage more private citizens to file qui tam suits, it also invites
parasitic claims3 5 The Siller Court justified its holding by arguing that
tam plaintiff first would have to know of the report's existence in order to request access
to it." Id.
228. 63 F.3d 1512 (9th Cir. 1995).
229. See id. at 1519-20.
230. See Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1520; see also supra note 136 (explaining Congress's in-
tent when enacting the 1986 amendments).
231. See Ramseyer, 90 F.3d at 1520 (holding that only when information has been "'ir-
retrievably released into the public domain"' by a positive act of disclosure will the gov-
ernment no longer be able to suppress the allegations) (quoting Doe, 960 F.2d at 323).
232. See United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1347 (4th
Cir. 1994) (explaining how an action may be dismissed under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)
(1994)). If a qui tam plaintiff can get a court to adopt a restrictive interpretation of the
phrase "based upon," then it is less likely that s/he will have to deal with trying to show the
information was not publicly disclosed or that s/he is an original source. See id.
233. See United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club, 105 F.3d 675,
683 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (ruling that a qui tam plaintiff only needs to be an original source if
the suit is based on publicly disclosed information).
234. See supra note 169 (citing cases equating "based upon" with "substantially similar
to").
235. See Doe, 960 F.2d at 324 (stating that parasitic actions would flourish if courts did
not interpret "based upon" to include allegations similar to those already disclosed); see
also United States ex rel. Biddle v. Board of Trustees, 147 F.3d 821, 828 (9th Cir. 1998)
(concluding that the approach in Siller works at cross-purposes with the twin goals of the
FCA). Biddle maintains that persons who merely repeat information similar to that which
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anything not actually derived from public disclosures cannot be consid-
ered parasitic.236 This assumption, however, is not well thought out. Such
an interpretation allows an unscrupulous plaintiff to read about a
fraudulent transaction in a local paper and then conduct his own "inves-
tigation" of the matter.237 If the person acts quickly, s/he can beat the
government to the courthouse with a suit that incorporates nothing but
information already known to the public.238 Such a suit is parasitic be-
cause the relator is bringing nothing new to the table; yet s/he stands to
take a significant portion of the government's recovery 39 Such a suit
also brings back the race to the courthouse problem that Congress
thought it defeated in 1943. 4
Once allegations of fraud have reached the public eye, the usefulness
of the qui tam plaintiff is sharply decreased. 41 The majority approach
more closely matches the intent of the False Claims Act. Interpreting
"based upon" to mean "substantially similar to" limits parasitic suits by
requiring the relator to bring new information to the table.42 A plaintiff
is already in the public domain should not be rewarded unless they took "'significant per-
sonal risks to bring such wrongdoing to light."' Id.
236. See Siller, 21 F.3d at 1348.
237. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 683.
238. See id.
239. See id. (using this example to point out deficiencies in the Fourth Circuit's inter-
pretation of "based upon"). A successful qui tam plaintiff may take up to 30% of the gov-
ernment's total recovery if the government does not intervene and 25% if the Govern-
ment does intervene. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (1994).
240. See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 10-13 (evaluating the problems of al-
lowing information readily available to the public to be used in qui tam litigation).
241. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 685 (noting that the government has less financial incen-
tive to encourage individuals to expose fraud once the allegations are in the public do-
main); see also United States ex rel. Biddle v. Board of Trustees, 147 F.3d 821, 828 (9th
Cir. 1998) (finding that a relator who merely repeats publicly disclosed information con-
fers no additional benefit to the government). Encouraging qui tam litigation at this point
only serves to pressure the government into action when it has reason not to act, or serves
to reduce the government's recovery in a successful case. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 685.
But cf. United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514, 1520
(10th Cir. 1996) (reasoning that Congress intended for the qui tam provisions to be used to
prod the Government into action when it was dragging its feet in prosecuting fraud); FCA
AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 6 (noting that it is difficult for the government to collect
all the pertinent information in a fraud case because it lacks the authority to compel depo-
sitions and the production of documents prior to filing a suit, and because the government
may not be able to use information it has obtained due to grand jury secrecy rules).
242. See United States ex rel. McKenzie v. Bellsouth Telecomm. Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 940
(6th Cir. 1997) (deciding that interpreting "based upon" to mean "supported by" restricts
the number of cases that can overcome the jurisdictional bar and thus reduces parasitic
suits); Findley, 105 F.3d at 683 ("our broader construction of the jurisdictional bar to en-
compass situations in which the relator's complaint repeats what the public already
knows" and discourages the opportunistic behavior Congress sought to prevent).
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who cannot bring new information does not provide a useful service to
the government. Furthermore, a legitimate whistleblower whose allega-
tions are similar to information in the public domain is still protected by
243the original source exception.
C. The Original Source Provision
Interpretations of the original source provisions have split the circuits
in three ways.244 The Second and Ninth Circuits have held, incorrectly,
that an original source must also be the source to the entity that publicly
disclosed the allegations.21 5 This conclusion is based on a trivial techni-
cality. 6 As the Fourth Circuit stated, the redundancy of the word "in-
formation" is of such slight consequence that it does not warrant ascrib-
ing different meanings to the same word in successive clauses.247 This
interpretation adds a new requirement to the statute that Congress did
141not envision.
While the Third, Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits' interpretations
have more merit than the Second and Ninth Circuits', they have also
misconstrued the statute. These circuits found that the original source
and the public disclosure provisions are unrelated and should be treated
separately.249 Such an analysis meets the plain text requirements of the
statute but fails to consider several important factors. First, this interpre-
243. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (providing that an original source can bring a
suit based on publicly disclosed information); see also Biddle, 147 F.3d at 829 n.2 ("It must
be remembered ... that [a relator's] failure to satisfy the 'based upon public disclosure'
requirement is not the end of the inquiry. If [the relator was] deemed an original source of
the information, the.., court could assert jurisdiction over his qui tam suit.").
244. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (discussing the different court in-
terpretations of what constitutes an "original source").
245. See Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1418 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that a qui
tam plaintiff must have played a role in bringing about the public disclosure of the allega-
tions); see also United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 16 (2d
Cir. 1990) ("[A] plaintiff.., must have directly or indirectly been a source to the entity
that publicly disclosed the allegations on which a suit is based.").
246. See United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1352 (4th
Cir. 1994) (declaring that the distinction employed by the Second and Ninth Circuits is of
"the most hypertechnical" type).
247. See id. "If the language of law is to have any meaning at all, then surely it must
prevail over the kind of speculation that is entailed in such an enterprise as [the Second
and Ninth Circuits] have undertaken." Id. at 1355.
248. See United States ex rel. McKenzie v. Bellsouth Telecomm. Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 941
(6th Cir. 1997); Siller, 21 F.3d at 1352; see also Salcido, supra note 27, at 286 (arguing that
the FCA does not include the independent "source" requirement imposed by the Second
and Ninth Circuits).
249. See supra note 173 (listing the cases finding that the original source does not have
to be the first person to reveal the fraud to the disclosing entity or to the government).
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tation ignores the requirement of an original source to provide informa-
tion voluntarily to the government.25° It would be a curious anomaly if
Congress intended for an original source to provide the government with
information when the suit is based on information the government al-
ready knows.2' Second, and as noted above, once allegations of fraud
surface into the public realm, there is less need for private citizens to sue
on behalf of the government.252 Once allegations reach the public do-
main, the government has the responsibility to decide whether or not to
prosecute the case. 3 The FCA is intended to break the "conspiracy of
silence,2 54 not reward those who wait to speak out until after someone
else has come forward.255
Thus, the only reasonable interpretation of the statute is that posited
by the D.C. and Sixth Circuits. 6 Under their analysis, a relator must
provide information to the government before the information is publicly
250. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (1994) ("'original source' means an individual who
has ... voluntarily provided the information [on which the allegations are based] to the
Government before filing an action").
251. See McKenzie, 123 F.3d at 942 (charging that a relator must be a "true whistle-
blower," and therefore, it is incomprehensible to call someone an original source if he is
not responsible for alerting the government to the fraud in the first place). All qui tam
plaintiffs are required under § 3730(b) to file their complaint with the government before
their suit may be initiated. Thus, the requirement in § 3730(e)(4)(B) to provide informa-
tion to the government must be intended to be more than just a procedural "heads-up"
because § 3730(b) already provides for this. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b), (e).
252. See supra note 241 (discussing why qui tam litigation is not valuable once infor-
mation has reached the public domain).
253. See United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees' Club, 105 F.3d 675,
685 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (contending that when information reaches the public domain, the
government should be allowed to exercise its prosecutorial discretion). Other parts of the
Act also indicate Congress' concern for maintaining the government's prosecutorial dis-
cretion by retaining its ability to intervene and dismiss actions already begun. See Salcido,
supra note 27, at 257-58 n.85 (examining the various ways Congress sought to insure the
government's ability to control qui tam litigation).
254. See FCA AMENDMENTS, supra note 1, at 6 (noting that Congress changed the qui
tam provisions in 1986 to allow "unwilling participants in fraudulent activity.., an oppor-
tunity to speak up and take action ... with some assurance their disclosures will lead to
results").
255. See United States ex rel. McKenzie v. Bellsouth Telecomm. Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 942
(6th Cir. 1997) (stating an original source should be a "true whistleblower"); Wang v.
FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1419-20 (9th Cir. 1992) ("If there is to be a bounty for disclos-
ing [allegations of fraud], it should go to one who in fact helped to bring them to light,"
not to someone who "sat quietly in the shadows and breathed not a word about them until
[after they were already disclosed].").
256. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 691 (concluding that this interpretation is the only read-
ing that both corrects the holding in Dean and accounts for Congress separating the origi-
nal source provision from the public disclosure provision).
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disclosed in order to be considered an original source.27 This reading of
the statute prevents opportunists from being rewarded once the fraud is
in the open while still protecting the party who initially exposes the
fraud.' 8 This interpretation also fits within the twin goals of the FCA29
First, it encourages persons privy to fraud to come forward because: 1)
the statute will protect them, and 2) if they delay, they may lose their op-
portunity to sue.W Second, it prevents parasitic suits by depriving those
who do not take the significant personal risk of exposing fraud from
reaping the reward. 6
IV. CONCLUSION
When courts interpret the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act,
they must consider the impact of their decisions on the Act's twin goals.
By allowing theoretical public disclosure to bar suits, certain courts have
tipped the scale too far in the direction of preventing parasitic suits at the
expense of barring useful qui tam actions. When the information is not
actually in the public domain, preventing people from using it to expose
a fraud serves no purpose.
Interpreting the phrase "based upon" as "derived from," on the other
hand, makes it too easy to file parasitic suits. Such a narrow definition
allows anyone to take information in the public domain and, after some
personal research, use it as the basis for a suit. This approach invites
parasitic suits. If the information is in the public domain, the law should
require an original source to bring the action. This prevents opportunists
from being rewarded while encouraging legitimate whistleblowers to
speak out.
Finally, courts should interpret the original source provision to en-
courage true whistleblowers to come forward while discouraging those
who sit on their information. Requiring an original source to provide in-
formation before the allegations enter the public domain meets both of
these ends.
257. See McKenzie, 123 F.3d at 942 (finding a relator must provide the government
with the information before the allegations are publicly disclosed); Findley, 105 F.3d at 690
("It is clear.., that an 'original source' must provide the government with the information
prior to any public disclosure").
258. See Findley, 105 F.3d at 691.
259. See McKenzie, 123 F.3d at 943 (deciding that both aims of the public disclosure
bar are met by this interpretation).
260. See id. at 942-43 (noting that the interpretation serves to bring wrongdoing to
light by encouraging persons with relevant information to speak out).
261. See id. at 942 (stating that the Act is not intended to reward those who sit on the
sidelines).
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